<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Publishing DTD v1.3 20210610//EN" "JATS-journalpublishing1-3.dtd">
<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">msuecon</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вестник Московского университета. Серия 6. Экономика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Lomonosov Economics Journal</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0130-0105</issn><publisher><publisher-name>MSUPRESS</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.55959/MSU0130-0105-6-60-5-5</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">msuecon-1307</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ТЕОРИЯ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ECONOMIC THEORY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Практики правоприменения и наказания в России раннего Нового времени: взгляд экономики права</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Practices of law enforcement and punishment in early modern Russia: from the perspective of law and economics</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7943-8854</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Калягин</surname><given-names>Г. В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kalyagin</surname><given-names>G. V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Калягин Григорий Владимирович — к.э.н., доцент, Экономический факультет</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">gkalyagin@yandex.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>МГУ имени М. В. Ломоносова</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Lomonosov Moscow State University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>02</day><month>12</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>60</volume><issue>5</issue><fpage>112</fpage><lpage>136</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Калягин Г.В., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Калягин Г.В.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Kalyagin G.V.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://msuecon.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/1307">https://msuecon.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/1307</self-uri><abstract><p>В настоящей статье с применением методов экономического анализа права (law and economics) исследуются три специфические практики правоприменения и наказания преступников, характерные для России раннего Нового времени. Рассматриваются институты, которые в современном обществе выглядят весьма спорными и противоречивыми, а часто — неэффективными с точки зрения гуманитарных стандартов и прав человека, однако имели широкое распространение в историческом периоде исследования. В частности, анализируются: 1) судебная трактовка алкогольного опьянения как смягчающего обстоятельства, что удивительно с точки зрения современного уголовного права, где опьянение скорее усугубляет ответственность; 2) применение пыток не только к обвиняемым, но и к свидетелям в процессе допросов, что сегодня признается закономерным нарушением прав и свобод; 3) замена физической меры наказания на иные, менее радикальные, но все же жестокие формы. Проведённый формальный и институциональный анализ показывает, что данные практики в условиях раннего Нового времени могли быть оправданны и эффективны с позиций государства, обеспечивая решение задач предупреждения повторных преступлений и поддержания общественного порядка. Результаты исследования подчеркивают важность исторического контекста и институциональной среды для понимания эффективности и причины появления тех или иных правоприменительных институтов.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The present article, employing the methods of economic analysis of law (law and economics), explores three specific practices of law enforcement and criminal punishment characteristic of early modern Russia. The study examines the institutions that, from the standpoint of contemporary society, seem controversial and often ineffective in the light of humanitarian standards and human rights, yet were prevaling during the historical period under consideration. Specifically, the article analyzes: (1) the judicial interpretation of alcohol intoxication as a mitigating circumstance—a notion that appears striking from the perspective of modern criminal law, where intoxication typically aggravates liability; (2) the use of torture not only against the accused but also against witnesses during interrogations, which today constitutes a clear violation of rights and freedoms; and (3) the substitution of corporal punishments with others, less radical yet still severe forms. The formal and institutional analysis demonstrates that such practices, within the context of the early modern period, could have been justified and effective from the standpoint of the state, as they served the purposes of deterring recidivism and maintaining public order. The findings emphasize the importance of historical context and institutional environment in understanding the effectiveness and origins of particular law enforcement mechanisms.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>экономика права</kwd><kwd>оптимальное правоприменение</kwd><kwd>сдерживание преступлений.</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>law and economics</kwd><kwd>optimal enforcement</kwd><kwd>crime deterrence.</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Грейф, А. (2013). Институты и путь к современной экономике. Уроки средневековой торговли. М.: Изд. дом Высшей школы экономики.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Christie, N. (2011). The Acceptable Quantity of Crime. Saint Petersburg: Aleteya.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Захаркин, С. Маньяка-расчленителя не просто выпустили, но еще и денег дадут. Информационное агентство URA.ru 08.02.2018. https://ura.news/articles/1036273844.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (CC RF) of 13.06.1996 No. 63-FZ.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit3"><label>3</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Козочкин, И. Д. (ред.) (2003). Уголовное право зарубежных государств. М.: Омега-Л.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Criminal Code of the RSFSR (adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on 27.10.1960).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit4"><label>4</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Коллманн, Н. Ш. (2016). Преступление и наказание в России раннего Нового времени. М.: Новое литературное обозрение.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Greif, A. (2013). Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Lessons from Medieval Trade. Moscow: Higher School of Economics Publishing House.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit5"><label>5</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Кристи, Н. (2011). Приемлемое количество преступлений. СПб.: Алетейя.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kozochkin, I. D. (Ed.). (2003). Criminal Law of Foreign States. Moscow: Omega-L.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit6"><label>6</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Перемолотова, Л. Ю., &amp; Шилов, А. И. (2013). Эволюция норм уголовного законодательства России об ответственности за преступления, совершаемые в состоянии алкогольного опьянения. Российский медико-биологический вестник имени академика И. П. Павлова, 21(3), 177–182.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kollmann, N. Sh. (2016). Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia. Moscow: New Literary Observer.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit7"><label>7</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Сулейманова, С. Т., &amp; Горбунова, К. А. (2012). Состояние опьянения как обстоятельство смягчающее наказание. Труды Международного Симпозиума «Надежность и Качество», 2, 363–364.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Peremolotova, L. Yu., &amp; Shilov, A. I. (2013). Evolution of Criminal Legislation Norms in Russia on Liability for Crimes Committed under Alcohol Intoxication. Pavlov Academic Medical and Biological Bulletin, 21(3), 177-182.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit8"><label>8</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации (УК РФ) от 13.06.1996 № 63-ФЗ.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Suleymanova, S. T., &amp; Gorbunova, K. A. (2012). Intoxication as a Mitigating Circumstance. Proceedings of the International Symposium “Reliability and Quality”, 2, 363– 364.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit9"><label>9</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Уголовный кодекс РСФСР (утв. ВС РСФСР 27.10.1960).</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Baliga, S. (1999). Monitoring and collusion with «soft» information. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(2), 434–440. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/15.2.434.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit10"><label>10</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Baliga, S. (1999). Monitoring and collusion with «soft» information. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(2), 434–440. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/15.2.434.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit11"><label>11</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Buchanan, J. M. (1973). A defense of organized crime? In Simon Rottenberg (Ed.) The Economics of Crime and Punishment, 119–132. Washington, D. C. : American Enterprise Institute.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit12"><label>12</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Buchanan, J. M. (1973). A defense of organized crime? In Simon Rottenberg (Ed.) The Economics of Crime and Punishment, 119–132. Washington, D. C. : American Enterprise Institute.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Ehrlich, I. (1996). Crime, punishment, and the market for offenses. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1), 43–67.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit13"><label>13</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Ehrlich, I. (1996). Crime, punishment, and the market for offenses. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1), 43–67.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Ehrlich, I. (1981). On the usefulness of controlling individuals: An economic analysis of rehabilitation, incapacitation and deterrence. The American Economic Review, 71(3), 307–322.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit14"><label>14</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Ehrlich, I. (1981). On the usefulness of controlling individuals: An economic analysis of rehabilitation, incapacitation and deterrence. The American Economic Review, 71(3), 307–322.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Fiorentini, G. (2000). Organized crime and illegal markets. in Bouckaert, B. and G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume V: The Economics of Crime and Litigation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 434–459.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit15"><label>15</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Fiorentini, G. (2000). Organized crime and illegal markets. in Bouckaert, B. and G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume V: The Economics of Crime and Litigation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 434–459.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Garoupa, N. (2001). Optimal magnitude and probability of fines. European Economic Review, 45(9), 1765–1771. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00084-2.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit16"><label>16</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Garoupa, N. (2001). Optimal magnitude and probability of fines. European Economic Review, 45(9), 1765–1771. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00084-2.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Garoupa, N., &amp; Obidzinski, M. (2011). The scope of punishment: An economic theory. European Journal of Law and Economics, 31(3), 237–247. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9172-0.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit17"><label>17</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Garoupa, N., &amp; Obidzinski, M. (2011). The scope of punishment: An economic theory. European Journal of Law and Economics, 31(3), 237–247. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9172-0.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Garoupa, N., &amp; Rizzolli, M. (2012). Wrongful convictions do lower deterrence. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 168(2), 224–231.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit18"><label>18</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Garoupa, N., &amp; Rizzolli, M. (2012). Wrongful convictions do lower deterrence. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 168(2), 224–231.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kaplow, L., &amp; Shavell, S. (1994). Accuracy in the determination of liability. The Journal of Law &amp; Economics, 37(1), 1–15.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit19"><label>19</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kaplow, L., &amp; Shavell, S. (1994). Accuracy in the determination of liability. The Journal of Law &amp; Economics, 37(1), 1–15.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Keep, J. L. H. (1956). Bandits and the law in Muscovy. The Slavonic and East European Review, 35(84), 201–222.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit20"><label>20</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Keep, J. L. H. (1956). Bandits and the law in Muscovy. The Slavonic and East European Review, 35(84), 201–222.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Lando, H. (2006). Does wrongful conviction lower deterrence? The Journal of Legal Studies, 35(2), 327–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/501095.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit21"><label>21</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Lando, H. (2006). Does wrongful conviction lower deterrence? The Journal of Legal Studies, 35(2), 327–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/501095.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Lando, H., &amp; Mungan, M. C. (2018). The effect of type-1 error on deterrence. International Review of Law and Economics, 53, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2017.08.001.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit22"><label>22</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Lando, H., &amp; Mungan, M. C. (2018). The effect of type-1 error on deterrence. International Review of Law and Economics, 53, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2017.08.001.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Langbein, J. H. (1974). Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit23"><label>23</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Langbein, J. H. (1974). Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Levitt, S. D. (1998). Why do increased arrest rates appear to reduce crime: Deterrence, incapacitation, or measurement error? Economic Inquiry, 36(3), 353–372. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01720.x.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit24"><label>24</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Levitt, S. D. (1998). Why do increased arrest rates appear to reduce crime: Deterrence, incapacitation, or measurement error? Economic Inquiry, 36(3), 353–372. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01720.x.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Miceli, T. J. (2010). A model of criminal sanctions that incorporate both deterrence and incapacitation. Economics Letters, 107(2), 205–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.7econlet.2010.01.025.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit25"><label>25</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Miceli, T. J. (2010). A model of criminal sanctions that incorporate both deterrence and incapacitation. Economics Letters, 107(2), 205–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.7econlet.2010.01.025.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Mungan, M. C. (2015). Wrongful convictions and the punishment of attempts.International Review of Law and Economics, 42, 79–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2015.01.001.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit26"><label>26</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Mungan, M. C. (2015). Wrongful convictions and the punishment of attempts.International Review of Law and Economics, 42, 79–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2015.01.001.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Mungan, M. C. (2018). Optimal preventive law enforcement and stopping standards. American Law and Economics Review, 20(2), 289–317. https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahy003.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit27"><label>27</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Mungan, M. C. (2018). Optimal preventive law enforcement and stopping standards. American Law and Economics Review, 20(2), 289–317. https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahy003.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Obidzinski, M. (2020). Presumption of innocence and deterrence. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 176(2), 377–412. https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0025.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit28"><label>28</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Obidzinski, M. (2020). Presumption of innocence and deterrence. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 176(2), 377–412. https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0025.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Obidzinski, M., &amp; Oytana, Y. (2019). Identity errors and the standard of proof.International Review of Law and Economics, 57, 73–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.001.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit29"><label>29</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Obidzinski, M., &amp; Oytana, Y. (2019). Identity errors and the standard of proof.International Review of Law and Economics, 57, 73–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.001.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Png, I. P. L. (1986). Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error. International Review of Law and Economics, 6(1), 101–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-68188(86)90042-6.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit30"><label>30</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Png, I. P. L. (1986). Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error. International Review of Law and Economics, 6(1), 101–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-68188(86)90042-6.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Polinsky, A. M., &amp; Shavell, S. (1979). The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines. The American Economic Review, 69(5), 880–891.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit31"><label>31</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Polinsky, A. M., &amp; Shavell, S. (1979). The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines. The American Economic Review, 69(5), 880–891.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Rizzolli, M. (2016). Adjudication: Type-I and type-II errors. CERBE Working Papers, Article wpC15. https://ideas.repec.org//p/lsa/wpaper/wpc15.html.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit32"><label>32</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Rizzolli, M. (2016). Adjudication: Type-I and type-II errors. CERBE Working Papers, Article wpC15. https://ideas.repec.org//p/lsa/wpaper/wpc15.html.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Rizzolli, M., &amp; Saraceno, M. (2013). Better that ten guilty persons escape: Punishment costs explain the standard of evidence. Public Choice, 155(3), 395–411. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9867-y.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit33"><label>33</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Rizzolli, M., &amp; Saraceno, M. (2013). Better that ten guilty persons escape: Punishment costs explain the standard of evidence. Public Choice, 155(3), 395–411. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9867-y.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Shavell, S. (1990). Deterrence and the punishment of attempts. The Journal of Legal Studies, 19(2), 435–466.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit34"><label>34</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Shavell, S. (1990). Deterrence and the punishment of attempts. The Journal of Legal Studies, 19(2), 435–466.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Shavell, S. (2015). A simple model of optimal deterrence and incapacitation. International Review of Law and Economics, 42, 13–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2014.11.005.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit35"><label>35</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Shavell, S. (2015). A simple model of optimal deterrence and incapacitation. International Review of Law and Economics, 42, 13–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2014.11.005.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Silverman, L. (2001). Tortured Subjects: Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit36"><label>36</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Silverman, L. (2001). Tortured Subjects: Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization, 2(2), 181–214.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit37"><label>37</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization, 2(2), 181–214.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization, 2(2), 181–214.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref></ref-list><fn-group><fn fn-type="conflict"><p>The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.</p></fn></fn-group></back></article>
