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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">msuecon</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вестник Московского университета. Серия 6. Экономика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Lomonosov Economics Journal</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0130-0105</issn><publisher><publisher-name>MSUPRESS</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.55959/MSU0130-0105-6-61-3-6</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">msuecon-1809</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ФИНАНСОВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>FINANCIAL STUDIES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Как изменились мотивы делистинга российских компаний в кризис?</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>How voluntary delisting motives have changed for russian companies in crisis?</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6633-9619</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Кизько</surname><given-names>И. П.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kizko</surname><given-names>I. P.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Кизько Илья Петрович – аспирант</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">ikizko@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5567-8930</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Григорьева</surname><given-names>С. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Grigorieva</surname><given-names>S. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Григорьева Светлана Александровна – к.э.н., доцент</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">svetlanaagrigorieva@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Национальный исследовательский университет "Высшая школа экономики"</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>HSE University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>11</day><month>08</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>61</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>122</fpage><lpage>152</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Кизько И.П., Григорьева С.А., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Кизько И.П., Григорьева С.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Kizko I.P., Grigorieva S.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://msuecon.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/1809">https://msuecon.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/1809</self-uri><abstract><p>Рост числа добровольных делистингов на российском фондовом рынке в последние годы актуализирует вопрос о факторах, определяющих решения компаний об уходе с биржи, особенно в условиях кризисных изменений экономической среды. Цель настоящего исследования заключается в идентификации факторов добровольного делистинга российских компаний и оценке изменения их значимости в периоды пандемии COVID-19 и после начала специальной военной операции. Теоретической основой работы выступают подход баланса выгод и издержек публичного статуса компании (cost-benefit trade-off), а также положения агентской теории корпоративных финансов. Эмпирический анализ выполнен на выборке из 118 российских публичных компаний за период 2015–2023 гг., включающей 21 случай делистинга. Для проверки гипотез использована панельная пробит-модель со случайными эффектами, позволяющая оценить влияние финансовых и нефинансовых факторов на вероятность ухода компании с биржи.</p><p>Результаты исследования показывают, что в докризисный период основными факторами добровольного делистинга российских компаний выступали низкая ликвидность акций и недооцененность бизнеса рынком, что согласуется с рассмотренными в литературе мотивами ухода компаний с фондового рынка. Однако в кризисные периоды, охватывающие пандемию COVID-19 и период после начала СВО, значимость традиционных финансовых детерминант существенно снижается. Полученные результаты свидетельствуют о том, что решения о делистинге в условиях кризиса в большей степени определяются нефинансовыми факторами, включая смену состава ключевых акционеров. Это указывает на трансформацию мотивов ухода компаний с фондового рынка и ограниченность классических моделей делистинга при анализе кризисных периодов. Практическая значимость исследования заключается в возможности использования выявленных закономерностей для оценки риска делистинга российскими инвесторами, аналитиками и другими участниками рынка.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The growing number of voluntary delistings on the Russian stock market in recent years has increased interest in the factors influencing companies’ decisions to leave public equity markets, particularly in the context of crisis-driven changes in the economic environment. The purpose of this study is to identify the determinants of voluntary delisting among Russian public companies and to assess how their significance changed during the COVID-19 pandemic and following the onset of the Special Military Operation (SMO). The theoretical framework is based on the cost-benefit trade-off approach to public company status and on the agency theory of corporate finance. The empirical analysis relies on a sample of 118 Russian public companies observed over the period of 2015–2023, including 21 delisting cases. To test the hypotheses, we employ a random-effects panel probit model that enables the assessment of both financial and non-financial determinants of delisting decisions. The results indicate that in the pre-crisis period, the primary drivers of voluntary delisting among Russian companies are low stock liquidity and market undervaluation, which is consistent with the motives for delisting identified in the existing literature. However, during the crisis periods encompassing the COVID-19 pandemic and the period following the onset of the SMO, the explanatory power of traditional financial determinants declines substantially. The findings suggest that delisting decisions in times of crisis are increasingly driven by non-financial factors, including changes in the composition of key shareholders. This indicates the transformation in delisting motives and highlights the limitations of conventional delisting models when applied to crisis environments. The practical implication of the study lies in the potential use of the identified patterns for assessing delisting risk by investors, analysts, and other market participants.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>добровольный делистинг</kwd><kwd>делистинг</kwd><kwd>факторы делистинга</kwd><kwd>обратный выкуп акций</kwd><kwd>публичный акционерный капитал</kwd><kwd>корпоративные финансы</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>voluntary delisting</kwd><kwd>delisting</kwd><kwd>delisting factors</kwd><kwd>public equity</kwd><kwd>shares buyback</kwd><kwd>corporate finance</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Андрукович, П. Ф. (2019) Динамика котировок акций при их листинге и делистинге. 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