msueconВестник Московского университета. Серия 6. ЭкономикаLomonosov Economics Journal0130-0105MSUPRESS10.38050/01300105202115msuecon-630Research ArticleОТРАСЛЕВАЯ И РЕГИОНАЛЬНАЯ ЭКОНОМИКАBRANCH AND REGIONAL ECONOMYApp Store: границы рынка и рыночная власть AppleApp Store: market boundaries and Apple’s market powerhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9416-4086ПавловаН. С.PavlovaN. S.

Павлова Наталья Сергеевна — кандидат экономических наук, доцент кафедры конкурентной и промышленной политики экономического факультета

Москва

Moscow

pavl.ns@yandex.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6025-7551КурдинА. А.KurdinA. A.

Курдин Александр Александрович — кандидат экономических наук, старший научный сотрудник кафедры конкурентной и промышленной политики экономического факультета

Москва

Moscow

aakurdin@gmail.comhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-6250-8454ПоляковД. А.PolyakovD. A.

Поляков Дмитрий Алексеевич — руководитель отдела охраны интеллектуальной собственности и защиты

Москва

Moscow

dmitry.polyakov@kaspersky.comМГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова, РАНХиГСРоссияLomonosov Moscow State University, RANEPARussian FederationМГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова, РАНХиГС; НИУ Высшая школа экономикиРоссияLomonosov Moscow State University, RANEPA; NRU Higher School of EconomicsRussian FederationАО «Лаборатория Касперского»РоссияKaspersky LabRussian Federation20212604202101103127Copyright © Павлова Н.С., Курдин А.А., Поляков Д.А., 20212021Павлова Н.С., Курдин А.А., Поляков Д.А.Pavlova N.S., Kurdin A.A., Polyakov D.A.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://msuecon.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/630

Статья основана на результатах исследования рынков мобильных приложений. Распределение рыночной власти на этих рынках зависит от способности владельца цифровой экосистемы контролировать обращение мобильных приложений внутри своей экосистемы. Степень этого контроля определяется взаимозаменяемостью различных магазинов мобильных приложений как необходимых инструментов для предоставления доступа к мобильным приложениям. Авторы предоставляют основанные на результатах опроса эмпирические оценки такой взаимозаменяемости для магазина мобильных приложений от Apple — App Store. Результаты проводимых далее различных тестов на определение границ рынка подтверждают укорененность конечных пользователей в экосистеме Apple в отсутствие разумных возможностей изменить операционную систему и соответственно магазин приложений. Этот результат объясняет степени рыночной власти Apple и дает основание для антимонопольного вмешательства.

The article is based on the research in mobile applications markets. The distribution of market power in these markets depends on the ability of a digital ecosystem’s owner to control the handling of mobile applications inside the ecosystem. The degree of this control is determined by the substitutability of different application stores as necessary facilities for the access to mobile applications. The authors provide the survey-based empirical estimates of such substitutability for Apple’s mobile application store — App Store. The results of further tests for market boundaries delineation confirm the embeddedness of final users in Apple’s ecosystem in absence of feasible opportunities to change the operating system and, consequently, the application store. The findings explain the degree of Apple’s market power and provide grounds for antitrust intervention.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.