<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Publishing DTD v1.3 20210610//EN" "JATS-journalpublishing1-3.dtd">
<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">msuecon</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вестник Московского университета. Серия 6. Экономика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Lomonosov Economics Journal</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0130-0105</issn><publisher><publisher-name>MSUPRESS</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.38050/01300105202126</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">msuecon-685</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ПРОБЛЕМЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>MANAGEMENT ISSUES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Влияние гендерного состава совета директоров на результаты деятельности компании: опыт Германии, Австрии и Швейцарии</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The impact of gender composition of the Board of Directors on company's performance: evidence from Germany, Austria and Switzerland</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8985-4058</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Макушина</surname><given-names>Е. Ю.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Makushina</surname><given-names>E. Yu.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Макушина Елена Юрьевна — старший преподаватель школы финансов факультета экономических наук</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">emakushina@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6312-4209</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Евсиков</surname><given-names>Н. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Evsikov</surname><given-names>N. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Евсиков Никита Александрович — студент</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">naevsikov@edu.hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>НИУ «Высшая школа экономики»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>NRU Higher School of Economics</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>03</day><month>06</month><year>2021</year></pub-date><volume>1</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>140</fpage><lpage>158</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Макушина Е.Ю., Евсиков Н.А., 2021</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2021</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Макушина Е.Ю., Евсиков Н.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Makushina E.Y., Evsikov N.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://msuecon.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/685">https://msuecon.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/685</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье изучаются изменения управляющих лиц в корпоративных структурах в динамике финансовых показателей немецких, австрийских и швейцарских компаний. Целью работы является выявление наличия взаимосвязи между финансовыми результатами деятельности компаний и гендерным составом советов директоров. Объектом исследования является отчетность европейских компаний, а предмет — состав совета директоров и финансовые результаты.</p><p>Используя выборку из 177 компаний за период 2014–2019 гг., был применен метод парной регрессии для выявления возможных статистически значимых зависимостей между финансовыми результатами и составом органов корпоративного управления. Результаты исследования не подтвердили негативное влияние квотирования количества числа женщин в составах советов директоров на финансовые результаты деятельности компаний. Была выявлена положительная зависимость между увеличением количества женщин в правлении и финансовыми результатами для отраслей недвижимости и промышленности; отрицательная зависимость финансовых результатов австрийских компаний от увеличения числа женщин в советах директоров, положительная — швейцарских компаний от увеличения доли женщин в составе правления; отсутствие влияния роста числа женщин в советах директоров на их долю в правлениях.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article examines the changes in corporate governance bodies connected with financial performance dynamics in German, Austrian and Swiss companies. The main objective of the study is to trace the causal links between financial indicators and Board’s gender composition. The paper uses the reports of European companies to determine the Board composition and financial outcomes.</p><p>Using a sample of 177 corporations and data on their Board and management composition along with financial performance indicators in 2014–2019, the authors apply regressions to determine statistically relevant relations between Board compositions and financial results. The findings show no negative effect of female representation in the Board on corporate financial performance. The study identifies a visible positive correlation between an increasing female representation in the Board and financial outcomes in real estate and manufacturing sector. Austria shows negative dependence of financial outcomes on increasing female representation in the Board, with a reverse situation in Switzerland. The results also show no correlation between the number of female directors and female managers.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>корпоративное управление</kwd><kwd>позитивная дискриминация</kwd><kwd>гендерные квоты</kwd><kwd>государственное регулирование</kwd><kwd>совет директоров</kwd><kwd>правление</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>corporate governance</kwd><kwd>diversity</kwd><kwd>gender quotas</kwd><kwd>regulation</kwd><kwd>board of directors</kwd><kwd>management board</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Adams, R. B., &amp; Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of financial economics, 94(2), 291–309.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Adams, R. B., &amp; Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of financial economics, 94(2), 291–309.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Bechtoldt, M. N., Bannier, C. E., &amp; Rock, B. (2019). The glass cliff myth? — Evidence from Germany and the UK. The Leadership Quarterly, 30(3), 273–297.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bechtoldt, M. N., Bannier, C. E., &amp; Rock, B. (2019). The glass cliff myth? — Evidence from Germany and the UK. The Leadership Quarterly, 30(3), 273–297.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit3"><label>3</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Becht, M., Bolton, P., &amp; Röell, A. (2003). Corporate governance and control. In Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Vol. 1, pp. 1–109). Elsevier.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Becht, M., Bolton, P., &amp; Röell, A. (2003). Corporate governance and control. In Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Vol. 1, pp. 1–109). Elsevier.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit4"><label>4</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Bennouri, M., De Amicis, C., &amp; Falconieri, S. (2020). Welcome on board: A note on gender quotas regulation in Europe. Economics Letters, 190, 109055.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bennouri, M., De Amicis, C., &amp; Falconieri, S. (2020). Welcome on board: A note on gender quotas regulation in Europe. Economics Letters, 190, 109055.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit5"><label>5</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Brady, D., Isaacs, K., Reeves, M., Burroway, R., &amp; Reynolds, M. (2011). Sector, size, stability, and scandal: Explaining the presence of female executives in Fortune 500 firms. Gender in Management: An International Journal.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Brady, D., Isaacs, K., Reeves, M., Burroway, R., &amp; Reynolds, M. (2011). Sector, size, stability, and scandal: Explaining the presence of female executives in Fortune 500 firms. Gender in Management: An International Journal.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit6"><label>6</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">De Cabo, R. M., Terjesen, S., Escot, L., &amp; Gimeno, R. (2019). Do ‘soft law’board gender quotas work? Evidence from a natural experiment. European Management Journal, 37(5), 611–624.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">De Cabo, R. M., Terjesen, S., Escot, L., &amp; Gimeno, R. (2019). Do ‘soft law’board gender quotas work? Evidence from a natural experiment. European Management Journal, 37(5), 611–624.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit7"><label>7</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Comi, S., Grasseni, M., Origo, F., &amp; Pagani, L. (2020). Where women make a difference: gender quotas and firms’ performance in three European countries. ILR Review, 73(3), 768 –793.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Comi, S., Grasseni, M., Origo, F., &amp; Pagani, L. (2020). Where women make a difference: gender quotas and firms’ performance in three European countries. ILR Review, 73(3), 768 –793.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit8"><label>8</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">DiTomaso, N., Post, C., &amp; Parks-Yancy, R. (2007). Workforce diversity and inequality: Power, status, and numbers. Annu. Rev. Sociol., 33, 473–501.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">DiTomaso, N., Post, C., &amp; Parks-Yancy, R. (2007). Workforce diversity and inequality: Power, status, and numbers. Annu. Rev. Sociol., 33, 473–501.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit9"><label>9</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Holst, E., &amp; Kirsch, A. (2014). Executive board and supervisory board members in Germany’s large corporations remain predominantly male. DIW Economic Bulletin, 5(4), 35–47.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Holst, E., &amp; Kirsch, A. (2014). Executive board and supervisory board members in Germany’s large corporations remain predominantly male. DIW Economic Bulletin, 5(4), 35–47.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit10"><label>10</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Jackson, S. E., May, K. E., Whitney, K., Guzzo, R. A., &amp; Salas, E. (1995). Understanding the dynamics of diversity in decision-making teams. Team effectiveness and decision making in organizations, 204, 261.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Jackson, S. E., May, K. E., Whitney, K., Guzzo, R. A., &amp; Salas, E. (1995). Understanding the dynamics of diversity in decision-making teams. Team effectiveness and decision making in organizations, 204, 261.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit11"><label>11</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Joecks, J., Pull, K., &amp; Vetter, K. (2013). Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm performance: What exactly constitutes a “critical mass?”. Journal of business ethics, 118(1), 61–72.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Joecks, J., Pull, K., &amp; Vetter, K. (2013). Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm performance: What exactly constitutes a “critical mass?”. Journal of business ethics, 118(1), 61–72.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit12"><label>12</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Mitnick, B. M. (2006). Origin of the theory of Agency; an account by one of the originators. Social Sciences Research Network; Working Paper Series.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Mitnick, B. M. (2006). Origin of the theory of Agency; an account by one of the originators. Social Sciences Research Network; Working Paper Series.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit13"><label>13</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Müller, R., Lipp, L., &amp; Plüss, A. (2007). Der Verwaltungsrat. Schulthess, 3.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Müller, R., Lipp, L., &amp; Plüss, A. (2007). Der Verwaltungsrat. Schulthess, 3.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit14"><label>14</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Mulcahy, M., &amp; Linehan, C. (2014). Females and precarious board positions: Further evidence of the glass cliff. British Journal of Management, 25(3), 425–438.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Mulcahy, M., &amp; Linehan, C. (2014). Females and precarious board positions: Further evidence of the glass cliff. British Journal of Management, 25(3), 425–438.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit15"><label>15</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Pfeffer, J., &amp; Salancik, G. R. (2003). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. Stanford University Press.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Pfeffer, J., &amp; Salancik, G. R. (2003). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. Stanford University Press.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit16"><label>16</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Pletzer, J. L., Nikolova, R., Kedzior, K. K., &amp; Voelpel, S. C. (2015). Does gender matter? Female representation on corporate boards and firm financial performance-a metaanalysis. PloS one, 10(6), e0130005.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Pletzer, J. L., Nikolova, R., Kedzior, K. K., &amp; Voelpel, S. C. (2015). Does gender matter? Female representation on corporate boards and firm financial performance-a metaanalysis. PloS one, 10(6), e0130005.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit17"><label>17</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Post, C., &amp; Byron, K. (2015). Women on boards and firm financial performance: A metaanalysis. Academy of management Journal, 58(5), 1546–1571.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Post, C., &amp; Byron, K. (2015). Women on boards and firm financial performance: A metaanalysis. Academy of management Journal, 58(5), 1546–1571.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit18"><label>18</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Ryan, M. K., &amp; Haslam, S. A. (2005). The glass cliff: Evidence that women are overrepresented in precarious leadership positions. British Journal of management, 16(2), 81–90.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Ryan, M. K., &amp; Haslam, S. A. (2005). The glass cliff: Evidence that women are overrepresented in precarious leadership positions. British Journal of management, 16(2), 81–90.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit19"><label>19</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Tobin, J., &amp; Brainard, W. C. (1976). Asset markets and the cost of capital (No. 427). Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Tobin, J., &amp; Brainard, W. C. (1976). Asset markets and the cost of capital (No. 427). Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit20"><label>20</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Van Knippenberg, D., De Dreu, C. K., &amp; Homan, A. C. (2004). Work group diversity and group performance: an integrative model and research agenda. Journal of applied psychology, 89(6), 1008.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Van Knippenberg, D., De Dreu, C. K., &amp; Homan, A. C. (2004). Work group diversity and group performance: an integrative model and research agenda. Journal of applied psychology, 89(6), 1008.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit21"><label>21</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Yang, P., Riepe, J., Moser, K., Pull, K., &amp; Terjesen, S. (2019). Women directors, firm performance, and firm risk: A causal perspective. The Leadership Quarterly, 30(5), 101297.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Yang, P., Riepe, J., Moser, K., Pull, K., &amp; Terjesen, S. (2019). Women directors, firm performance, and firm risk: A causal perspective. The Leadership Quarterly, 30(5), 101297.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit22"><label>22</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Yıldız, S., Meydan, C., Taştan Boz, İ., &amp; Sakal, Ö. (2019). Do the Quota Applications for Women on Boards Improve Financial Performance. Sustainability, 11(21), 5901.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Yıldız, S., Meydan, C., Taştan Boz, İ., &amp; Sakal, Ö. (2019). Do the Quota Applications for Women on Boards Improve Financial Performance. Sustainability, 11(21), 5901.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit23"><label>23</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">World Bank. Doing Business 2020 Rating. https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2020</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">World Bank. Doing Business 2020 Rating. https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2020</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit24"><label>24</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">OECD. Women share among largest corporations’ directors per country. https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54753</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">OECD. Women share among largest corporations’ directors per country. https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54753</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit25"><label>25</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">FIDAR. Women Empowerment Report 2012–2019. https://www.fidar.de/wob-indizesstudien.html</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">FIDAR. Women Empowerment Report 2012–2019. https://www.fidar.de/wob-indizesstudien.html</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit26"><label>26</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">SMI. SMI Factsheet, SIX Swiss Exchange, SMI Index description. http://www.six-swissexchange.com/downloads/indexinfo/online/share_indices/smi/smifamily_factsheet_en.pdf</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">SMI. SMI Factsheet, SIX Swiss Exchange, SMI Index description. http://www.six-swissexchange.com/downloads/indexinfo/online/share_indices/smi/smifamily_factsheet_en.pdf</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref></ref-list><fn-group><fn fn-type="conflict"><p>The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.</p></fn></fn-group></back></article>
