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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">msuecon</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вестник Московского университета. Серия 6. Экономика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Lomonosov Economics Journal</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0130-0105</issn><publisher><publisher-name>MSUPRESS</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.55959/MSU0130-0105-6-58-3-2</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">msuecon-938</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ФИНАНСОВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>FINANCIAL STUDIES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Институционализация бюджетных правил: мировой и российский опыт</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Institutionalization of fiscal rules: international and Russian experience</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7775-2548</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Комарницкая</surname><given-names>А. Н.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Komarnitskaya</surname><given-names>A. N.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Комарницкая Анна Николаевна — научный сотрудник, Лаборатория исследований бюджетной политики Института прикладных экономических исследований</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">komarnitskaya-an@ranepa.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0431-4993</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Соколов</surname><given-names>И. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Sokolov</surname><given-names>I. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Соколов Илья Александрович — к.э.н., зав. Лабораторией исследований бюджетной политики Института прикладных экономических исследований, РАНХиГС; ведущий научный сотрудник ИИСЭТиФП Финансового университета при Правительстве РФ</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">sokolov-ia@ranepa.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>RANEPA</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ; Финансовый университет при Правительстве РФ</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>RANEPA; Financial University under the Government of the Russian&#13;
Federation</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>12</day><month>03</month><year>2023</year></pub-date><volume>58</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>25</fpage><lpage>43</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Комарницкая А.Н., Соколов И.А., 2023</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2023</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Комарницкая А.Н., Соколов И.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Komarnitskaya A.N., Sokolov I.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://msuecon.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/938">https://msuecon.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/938</self-uri><abstract><p>Периоды экономической нестабильности вынуждают правительства принимать экстренные решения по поддержке бизнеса и населения в ущерб бюджетной несбалансированности. При подобных обстоятельствах лучше всего проверяется гибкость бюджетных правил – набора ограничений на основные параметры бюджета. Зачастую их действие приостанавливается, корректируются предельные значения заложенных в них показателей, вводятся временные послабления на их применение. Внедрение такого инструмента и его устойчивость во времени зависят в первую очередь от политической воли правительства и законодателей. В то же время поддерживаемые властью бюджетные ограничения, как показывает мировой опыт, нуждаются в сопутствующей системе адаптационных и контрольных условий, позволяющих правилам не только лучше подстраиваться под экономические вызовы, но и не отступать от своей исходной задачи – обеспечения среднесрочной сбалансированности бюджета при поддержании условно постоянного уровня бюджетных расходов. Именно институциональные условия функционирования бюджетных правил — предмет изучения в настоящей статье.</p><p>Цель исследования — выявление используемых в мире институциональных основ обеспечения надлежащей работоспособности бюджетных правил и оценка их практической применимости в России. Используя методы описательного статистического и сравнительного анализов международной и российской практики применения бюджетных правил, авторы определили и проанализировали перечень таких институциональных условий, как среднесрочные рамки планирования расходов, бюджетные советы, механизмы корректировки бюджетной политики при нарушении правил, оговорки об освобождении от обязательств соблюдения правил.</p><p>Результаты исследования — сформулированные необходимые и достаточные институциональные основы для эффективности бюджетных правил. В силу применения в России только среднесрочного бюджетного планирования оставшиеся три условия могут выступать ориентиром для имплементации в ходе текущей реформы бюджетных ограничений.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Economic instability forces governments to urgently support businesses and the public at the expense of budgetary imbalances. Such circumstances test flexibility of fiscal rules — restrictions on the main budget parameters. They are often suspended, the limit values of their indicators are adjusted, temporary concessions for their use are introduced. Both the introduction of such instrument and its sustainability over time depend primarily on the government and policymakers. At the same time world experience proves that budget restrictions supported by the authorities need a complementing system of adaptation and controlling conditions allowing for a better adaptation to economic challenges and following their original task — to ensure medium-term budget balance while maintaining a conditionally constant level of budget expenditures. The subject in the paper is the institutional conditions for fiscal rules’ functioning. The purpose of the study is to identify the institutional framework used to ensure proper performance of fiscal rules and assess its practical applicability in Russia. Using the methods of descriptive statistical and comparative analysis of international and Russian practice in applying fiscal rules, the authors identify and analyze the list of such institutional conditions as medium-term expenditure frameworks, fiscal councils, correction mechanisms, escape clauses. The results of the study consist in formulated required and sufficient institutional framework for effective fiscal rules. Due to the use of only medium-term budget planning in Russia the remaining three may serve as a guideline for implementing budget restrictions during the current reform.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>бюджетное правило</kwd><kwd>бюджетная устойчивость</kwd><kwd>среднесрочное бюджетное планирование</kwd><kwd>бюджетный совет</kwd><kwd>оговорки об освобождении</kwd><kwd>механизмы корректировки бюджетной политики</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>fiscal rule</kwd><kwd>fiscal sustainability</kwd><kwd>expenditure framework</kwd><kwd>fiscal council</kwd><kwd>escape clauses</kwd><kwd>correction mechanism</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Alesina, A., &amp; Tabellini, G. (1990). 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