Petrovskaya modernization — “war miracle” instead of “economic miracle”?

In modern Russia Peter the Great, according to representative opinion polls, is considered to be the best figure in the entire history of the country, significantly outstripping in popularity even domestic politicians of the 20th–21st centuries. This very high “folk” reputation significantly contradicts the views of social scientists who see in Peter I not so much a successful national reformer, a “revolutionary on the throne”, but a despot unscrupulous in his means, who for centuries to come linked modernization of the country with increased state coercion and heavy wars. However, comparative approach shows that other countries of catching up development pattern in the XVIII–XX centuries followed as a rule not the path of evolutionary reform but that of radical reforms aimed primarily at strengthening the army. Peter's Russia stands out against this background only in that it was the first to choose “modernization for the sake of military victories” and therefore, since the time of Peter I, remained among the “great powers” despite constant socio-economic backwardness. The legitimacy of this choice can be substantiated with the help of a world-systems analysis that emphasizes the great role of national sovereignty for the success of catch-up modernization. In fact, Peter I chose the war with strong Sweden as a main lever of modernization and a way to radically change the “rules of the game” — not only to open direct trade between Russia and Western Europe, but also to include it in the “great powers”. The example of Peter the Great's reforms, which almost coincided with the Northern War, clearly shows that military mobilization can play the role of a “big push” in a country that is catching up, creating the prerequisites for all other qualitative transformations. At the same time, “modernization for the sake of victories” that took shape under Peter the Great initiated a trend that is dangerous for Russia as a country of catching up development, when its military successes hindered the seemingly unnecessary national modernization, with military failures stimulating it

1. Abalov, A., & Inozemtsev, V. (2021). Infinite Empire. Russia in search of itself. M.: Alpina ublisher

2. Andreev, A. L. (2022). A reformer before the court of history: the image of Peter the Great in the collective memory of Russians. Sociological Research 4 136–145. DOI: 0.3185 / 013216250018468

3. Anisimov, E. (2017). Peter the Great: good or bad for Russia? M.: New Literary Review Auzan, A. A. (2022). The Cultural Codes of the Economy: How Values Affect Competition,

4. Democracy, and the Welfare of a People. M.: AST

5. Bagger, H. (1985). Reforms of Peter the Great. M.: Progress

6. Burovsky, A. M. (2008). Peter the Great. Damn emperor. M.: Yauza; Eksmo Gershenkron, A. (2015). Economic backwardness in historical perspective. M.: Publishing house “Delo” RANEPA

7. Latov, Yu. V. (2022). Concepts and empiricism of the transit use of the Russian space.

8. Social Research 8 105–115. DOI: 0.3185/S013216250021067

9. Mironov, B. N. (2003). Social history of Russia in the period of the empire (XVIII early XX century) St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin

10. Nureev, R. M., & Latov, Yu. V. (2016). Economic history of Russia (an experience of institutional analysis) 2nd ed. M.: KNORUS

11. Peter the Great: pro et contra. (2003). M.: RKhGA

12. Polterovich, V. M. (2007). Institutional Reform Strategies, or The Art of Reform: Preprint WP10/2007/08. M.: State University Higher School of Economics

13. Wallerstein, I. (2015–2016). The Modern World System. Vol. I–IV. M.: Russian oundation for the Promotion of Education and Science