Property rights guarantees as prerequisites for economic competition: an empirical study

Abstract

Economic competition by definition implies a choice between competing alternatives. But can economic agents always protect their rights to make this choice? In order to protect property rights, they should have a guarantor who imposes sanctions on the violator. However, the guarantor must be able to use violence, since the imposition of sanctions is often not voluntary. This paper shows that the uneven distribution of violence in society, which is not monopolized by one decision-making center and/or applied outside the rule of law, hinders economic competition. In such a situation, i.e. in a limited access social order, part of property rights remains unprotected, which prevents the entrepreneur from performing his/her function. The reason for this effect is the desire of the elite to maintain the status quo in distribution of rents: they try to avoid changes caused by the market process that may lead to a violation of existing political balance. In this study, the stated theses are confirmed on microdata of the BEEPS industrial enterprises survey by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development — we test the hypotheses using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and discrete choice models. Empirical analysis allows us to argue that in the limited access order, the obstacle to participation in economic competition is a weak property rights protection — it forces firms to compete for limited resources not by satisfying the needs of consumers, but by following the interests of the property rights guarantor. The results of the study can be useful in developing competition policy measures and explaining the phenomenon of «regulatory bias» in antitrust policy of developing countries.