Transparency of information disclosure by Russian companies with state participation: the impact of the composition and structure of the board of directors

In modern Russian conditions, the importance of improving the quality of corporate governance and information transparency of corporations is increasing. The influence of ownership structure, namely the presence of state participation in equity, on the disclosure of non-financial (ESG) information by Russian companies remains insufficiently studied. The study tests the hypothesis that state-owned companies and companies with state participation are worse at disclosing ESG indicators than private companies. The article also explores the influence of the characteristics of the board of directors (the number of board members, the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of female directors, as well as the presence of a sustainability committee) on the level of ESG transparency of Russian companies with state participation. Resource theory and agent theory are used as the theoretical basis of the research. Descriptive analysis and panel data regression analysis are used as the main research method. The study sample includes financial and non-financial data on 34 listed Russian companies between 2012 and 2021. As a result of the study, it was proved that companies with state participation are characterized by a lower level of ESG transparency than companies without state participation. In addition, it was found that in companies with state participation, an important determinant of ESG transparency is the presence of a sustainability committee, while the quantitative composition, independence and diversity of the board of directors do not affect the degree of ESG transparency of such companies. The study allows us to conclude that in order to significantly improve the degree of ESG transparency and, consequently, the quality of corporate governance in public companies with state participation, it may be recommended to establish a sustainability committee of the company’s board of directors. The results obtained can be applied by state property management bodies, investors and other interested parties

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