Rule of Reason (ROR): Gains and Risks
https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201814
Abstract
This article discusses the rapid formation of the Rule of Reason (ROR) approach in antitrust policy in the field of anti - competitive agreements. In many countries (the US, EU) there was a significant reduction of the use of per se approach (prohibition on the base of formal characteristics) in favor of the ROR approach, nowadays agreements are usually permitted or prohibited on the basis of the analysis of positive and negative effects. The article analyzes and summarizes the experience of these jurisdictions in the development of the ROR approach, the chronology for agreements of various types (horizontal, vertical agreements). The role of discussions in economic theory in this process was provided the argumentation for the expansion of effects evaluation. At the same time, the article examines the problems of this transformation, taking into account the problems of legal uncertainty, growing risks of type 2 errors.
About the Author
A. V. Makarov
National Research University "Higher School of Economics»
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Makarov A.V. Rule of Reason (ROR): Gains and Risks. Moscow University Economics Bulletin. 2018;(1):65-81. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201814
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