Economic framework of tariffs’ determination in telecommunication services: a digital business in an “analogue” environment?
https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201967
Abstract
The article analyses the economic aspects of the application of antitrust legislation in the context of abuse of dominant position prohibition (primarily in the form of setting excessive prices) in industries that are characterized by a complexity of services both on the production side and on the demand side. Evidence from several recent antitrust cases against mobile network operators in Russia has shown that the analysis of prices for individual mobile services is incorrect outside the context of complex pricing under high joint fixed costs. The aim of this article is to explain the economic basis for changing the tariffs of telecommunication services in terms of antitrust legislation requirements. The article presents a direction for assessing the state of competition and the corresponding behavior of market participants (for example, attributes of determining excessive prices) taking into account the characteristics of the telecommunications industry, specially, the mobile services industry. Moreover, it is shown that mobile services exhibit the effects of active competition: a high quality of communication, high rates of innovative activity in the industry as a whole, as well as low prices.
About the Authors
N. S. Pavlova
RANEPA
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
A. Ye. Shastitko
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
K. A. Ionkina
RANEPA
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
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Review
For citations:
Pavlova N.S., Shastitko A.Ye., Ionkina K.A. Economic framework of tariffs’ determination in telecommunication services: a digital business in an “analogue” environment? Moscow University Economics Bulletin. 2019;(6):79-98. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201967
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