Ambivalence of the myth of Peter the Great in the new Russian political theology

The usual image of Peter I in the current public opinion is the great Russian emperor, who carried out a deep modernization of Russia, borrowing the best examples of Western culture, created a fleet, built a new capital of Russia — St. Petersburg, won a some of major military victories. Nevertheless, many historians assess the achievements of Peter the Great as very controversial: the location of the new capital was chosen very poorly, a sharp increase in tax exemptions repeatedly led to famine in the empire, which, in turn, led to a reduction in the population in the old Russian lands. Subsequently, part of the expensive fleet subsequently rotted, too large an army had to be reduced, the capital returned to Moscow for a while. The sharp strengthening of absolutism was accompanied by an increase in the enslavement of the peasants. Cultural innovations, including education, extended only to a very narrow layer of noble children. The backward class institutions hindered not only technological innovation, but also the freedom of enterprise. The adoption of the Table of Ranks exacerbated the problem of the “principal — agent” relationship, which was accompanied not only by the growth of corruption and favoritism, but also emergence of the dichotomy “rich state — poor population”, which has since become traditional for Russia. Therefore, in the light of the analysis from the standpoint of the new political economy, the assessment of the reforms of Peter the Great looks rather negative, the contribution of this politician looks incomparable both with the achievements of Alexei Mikhailovich “The Quietest” and with the reforms of Alexander II “The Liberator”. However, these statesmen are hardly present in contemporary Russian public opinion. This paradox is revealed in the article through the use of tools of political theology — Peter the Great is a necessary figure in the modern liberal-patriotic “civil religion”, while Alexander II, on the contrary, is associated with the “guilt complex” of the Russian intelligentsia, and his reforms must be characterized in a negative way. This largely predetermines the presets of modern researchers. At the same time, the sacredness of the image of Peter the Great is fraught with the danger of a simplified technocratic approach when trying to solve modern economic problems facing Russia.

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