Practices of law enforcement and punishment in early modern Russia: from the perspective of law and economics
https://doi.org/10.55959/MSU0130-0105-6-60-5-5
Abstract
The present article, employing the methods of economic analysis of law (law and economics), explores three specific practices of law enforcement and criminal punishment characteristic of early modern Russia. The study examines the institutions that, from the standpoint of contemporary society, seem controversial and often ineffective in the light of humanitarian standards and human rights, yet were prevaling during the historical period under consideration. Specifically, the article analyzes: (1) the judicial interpretation of alcohol intoxication as a mitigating circumstance—a notion that appears striking from the perspective of modern criminal law, where intoxication typically aggravates liability; (2) the use of torture not only against the accused but also against witnesses during interrogations, which today constitutes a clear violation of rights and freedoms; and (3) the substitution of corporal punishments with others, less radical yet still severe forms. The formal and institutional analysis demonstrates that such practices, within the context of the early modern period, could have been justified and effective from the standpoint of the state, as they served the purposes of deterring recidivism and maintaining public order. The findings emphasize the importance of historical context and institutional environment in understanding the effectiveness and origins of particular law enforcement mechanisms.
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For citations:
Kalyagin G.V. Practices of law enforcement and punishment in early modern Russia: from the perspective of law and economics. Lomonosov Economics Journal. 2025;60(5):112-136. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.55959/MSU0130-0105-6-60-5-5
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