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Вестник Московского университета. Серия 6. Экономика

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Политическая аффилированность в системе корпоративного управления: обзор международных исследований и проекция их результатов на российскую корпоративную среду

https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201827

Аннотация

Статья фокусируется на проблеме политической аффилированности в системе корпоративного управления и имеет целью осветить теоретические и методологические основы проблемы применительно к российской корпоративной среде. Статья включает в себя оценку научной актуальности направления исследований, обзор лежащих в основе проблемы фундаментальных теорий, анализ концепции политизации применительно к системе корпоративного управления, анализ применяемой в прикладных исследованиях методологии, оценку текущего состояния данной области исследования в мировой науке. Сделаны выводы об актуальности проблемы в отношении российской корпоративной среды, выявлена специфика проявления проблемы в России.

Об авторе

Д. А. Трифонов
Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»
Россия


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Рецензия

Для цитирования:


Трифонов Д.А. Политическая аффилированность в системе корпоративного управления: обзор международных исследований и проекция их результатов на российскую корпоративную среду. Вестник Московского университета. Серия 6. Экономика. 2018;(2):118-148. https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201827

For citation:


Trifonov D.A. Political Affiliation in Corporate Governance: International Studies Review and their Implications for the Russian Corporate Environment. Moscow University Economics Bulletin. 2018;(2):118-148. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201827

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