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Political Affiliation in Corporate Governance: International Studies Review and their Implications for the Russian Corporate Environment

https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201827

Abstract

The article focuses upon the problem of political affiliation in corporate governance. It aims to provide insights into theoretical and methodological aspects of the problem applied to the Russian corporate environment. The author evaluates the academic relevance of the problem in international studies, reviews the underpinning fundamental theories, provides an insight into the construct of political affiliation through the lens of corporate governance, outlines the methodology used in the studies of political affiliation to eventually assess the relevance of the problem to the Russian corporate environment.

About the Author

D. A. Trifonov
-
Russian Federation


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Review

For citations:


Trifonov D.A. Political Affiliation in Corporate Governance: International Studies Review and their Implications for the Russian Corporate Environment. Moscow University Economics Bulletin. 2018;(2):118-148. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201827

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ISSN 0130-0105 (Print)