HOW TO INCLUDE PIRATED GOODS IN THE MARKET BOUNDARIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF ANTITRUST LAW?
https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201861
Abstract
In many cases of competition law enforcement counterfeit goods are not included within the product-market boundaries on an equal basis with the original product. However, existing literature highlights that illegal copies should be included in market boundaries, since from the consumer's viewpoint counterfeit is a substitute of an original good. In this article, we determine the conditions under which counterfeit products should be included either in market shares of original producers or when counterfeit manufacturers should be recognized as right holder competitors. We conclude that in case of strong network effects counterfeit product should be included in the market share of the right holder. On the contrary, when network effects are weak, pirates or counterfeit manufacturers should be considered as competitors of original product producers.
About the Authors
А. Морозов
МГУ имени М. В. Ломоносова; РАНХиГС при Президенте РФ
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
А. Шаститко
МГУ имени М. В. Ломоносова (Москва, Россия); РАНХиГС при Президенте РФ (Москва, Россия)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
, HOW TO INCLUDE PIRATED GOODS IN THE MARKET BOUNDARIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF ANTITRUST LAW? Moscow University Economics Bulletin. 2018;(6):3-23. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105201861
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