Specifics of the production of pensionary good in Russia
https://doi.org/10.38050/013001052020310
Abstract
The author considers the concept of «pensionary good» and the specifics of its production at the state and non-state levels. The purpose of the study is to analyze the actions aimed at creating a «pensionary good» under the influence of incentives and coercion. Drawing on the theory of goods, the author comes to conclusion that the elements of pensionary good can be produced in the form of public goods, merit goods, club goods and private goods. The author identifies the specifics of pensionary good structure at the analyzed levels and shows that national pension in the Russian Federation is based on coercion, with stimulation being of secondary importance. Non-state-funded retirement also uses the coercion and incentives. It has been established that coercion and incentives provide contradictory results as mechanisms used in the process of producing a pensionary good. While preparing the article, the author used the data from the Federal Statistic Service, the Pension Fund of Russia and various sociological surveys and scientific works on pensions and insurance. The conclusions of the study may be useful for further research on the development of Russian pension system.
About the Author
V. V. Moseiko
Kaliningrad State Technical University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Kaliningrad
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For citations:
Moseiko V.V. Specifics of the production of pensionary good in Russia. Moscow University Economics Bulletin. 2020;(3):200-219. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.38050/013001052020310
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