Public procurement of the healthcare: the supplier’s role in the hospital work
https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105202046
Abstract
The research is devoted to the suppliers influence on hospital work on the example of Moscow public procurement in hospitals. An agency model defining the hospital interaction stages with suppliers were constructed. Using the descriptive statistics method and graphical data analysis, procurement was considered with the author’s database including 512 681 contracts of 1,2 trillion rubles for 2011–2019. The supplier’s work strategies and their fallouts for the services were emphasized. The criteria the suppliers must have to the contract execution were developed. The hypothesis was tested that suppliers selected in a competitive way ensure the effective procurement for hospitals. The empirical analysis showed that drug procurement had a strong competition at auctions and budget savings. The findings concluded that the suppliers play various roles in hospital work. The favourable situation is that the supplier fulfills the contract delivering quality procurement at an affordable price, in full and due time.
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For citations:
Kravtsova M.V. Public procurement of the healthcare: the supplier’s role in the hospital work. Moscow University Economics Bulletin. 2020;(4):109-131. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105202046
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