“Not that big”: market power sources of digital platforms
https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105202135
Abstract
Monopolization and the high concentration of capital in the hands of digital giants are of concern to antitrust authorities around the world. The purpose of the article is to identify possible sources of market power of the digital platform on the example of companies that own mobile app stores (Apple App Store and Google Play) and their relationships with application software developers and users. The paper also analyzes the possible positive and negative effects of the behavior of such companies for different groups of stakeholders. The study results suggests that the main complaints against digital platforms in terms of antitrust violations are quite similar and are described by a set of typical models of platform behavior. The negative impact of such behavior on competition in related markets is not necessarily due to the large size of such platforms or their lack of alternatives. Using the example of Apple, whose mobile phones occupy only about a quarter of the market, other sources of market power of the platform that are not related to smartphone market share are identified. The results obtained can be used both for the development of theoretical and methodological approaches to the economic analysis of platform activities, and for solving practical problems in antitrust.
About the Authors
L S. Plekhanova
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
I. S. Mashin
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
N. S. Pavlova
Lomonosov Moscow State University, RANEPA
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
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Review
For citations:
Plekhanova L.S., Mashin I.S., Pavlova N.S. “Not that big”: market power sources of digital platforms. Moscow University Economics Bulletin. 2021;(3):82-105. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.38050/01300105202135
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